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1 Introduction
Traditionally the corporate finance literature dealing with the problem of the
concentration of ownership has compared a dispersed ownership structure
where no shareholder has a significant stake with a concentrated ownership
structure were a large shareholder effectively controls the firm 1. The concen-
tration of ownership is seen as a mixed blessing. The controlling shareholder
can monitor managers, thus solving the agency problem between atomistic
shareholders and managers. However, if there are private benefits from con-
trol, the minority shareholders will now be expropriated by the controlling
shareholder who will divert funds towards the generation of private benefits,
taking a disproportionate amount of the corporations ongoing earnings2.
However, many companies have multiple large shareholders. In some
cases we observe a single controlling shareholder, who owns more than 50%
of the voting shares, accompanied by smaller but significant shareholders. In
other cases there are multiple controlling shareholders, each of whom holds
a fraction of shares smaller than that necessary for control, while at the
same time, taken together, their fractions are enough to control the com-
pany. Although they can be observed among listed companies, these forms
of ownership structure are specially prevalent in closely-held corporations3.
Still, very little is know about how large shareholders interact and share
1Among the seminal contributions in this literature we find Berle and Means (1932);
Jensen and Meckling (1976); Grossman and Hart, (1980); Sheleifer and Vishny (1986) and
Burkart et al. (1997).
2Barclay et al.(1993), Barclay and Holderness (1989) and Zingales (1994) measure
private benefits indirectly by showing that large blocks of ownership that confer voting
rights sell at a premium. Interestingly, Barclay et al. (1989) find that the premium is not
only paid for blocks large enough to confer control but also for smaller blocks representing
25% of the equity of a firm. This suggests that benefits of control are divisible and can be
shared by several large shareholders.
3Becht and Mayer (2002) find that more than 25% of listed European companies have
more than one large shareholder. Gomes and Novaes (2001) report that 57.2% of closely-
held corporations with sales above 10 million dollars in the US have more than one large
shareholder.
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power among themselves. Only very recently have a few theoretical papers
started to study how controlling groups are formed when there are multi-
ple large shareholders (Zwiebel, 1995; Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000) and
which are the effects that the composition of the controlling group (i.e. the
number of members of the controlling group and the concentration of their
respective stakes) may have both on how monitoring is conducted (Pagano
and Röell, 1998) and on the level of private benefit extraction (Bennedsen
and Wolfenzon, 2000; Gomes and Novaes, 2001).
Empirical evidence validating the theoretical predictions that emerge
form these papers is very limited. Volpin (2002) finds that the market value
of Italian listed firms is higher for companies with a voting syndicate than
for companies with a single large shareholder. Faccio et al. (2001) com-
pare the dividend policies of listed companies across different countries and
find that European companies pay higher dividends when they have multiple
large shareholders.. Lehman and Weigand (2000) show that the presence
of a second large shareholder improves the profitability of German listed
companies. These three papers only test whether the presence of multiple
large shareholders can affect performance. Maury and Pajuste (2003) go one
step further by testing whether the stake and type of the shareholders are
important. Using a sample of Finish listed firms they find that firm value
is positively affected by the presence of a third large shareholder when the
other two have comparable stakes and incentives to collude. All these pa-
pers focus on listed firms. However, as Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000)
argue the presence and power of multiple large shareholders is expected to
be much more important in closely-held corporations, characterized by the
absence of a liquid resale market for their shares and limited external control
mechanisms. This is, to our knowledge, the first paper that studies how the
structure of controlling groups formed by multiple large shareholders affects
the performance of closely-held firms.
This paper uses detailed ownership data from Spain to examine how mul-
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tiple large shareholders share control and extract private benefits in closely-
held corporations. The sample consists of a total number of 20313 firm-year
observations from Spanish firms during the period 1993 to 2000.
The data give a comprehensive picture of ownership of Spanish firms, in-
cluding a sub-sample of listed firms (1% of the firms). Moreover, the data
set is representative of a country where ownership structure is concentrated
in both in listed and non-listed firms and legal protection for minority share-
holders is weak, which is the common case in Continental Europe (La Porta
et al. 1999).
We find that ownership structures with multiple large shareholders rep-
resent 37.5% of the total and that they are very stable. For each observation
we identify the controlling group as the group of shareholders that are more
likely to form a coalition with enough votes to control the decisions of the
firm. Each controlling group is characterized by its stake and by its number
of members. We first study whether these ownership structures are exoge-
nously given or consciously chosen taking into account firm characteristics.
We are unable to explain the choice of the ownership structures and interpret
this as evidence that, to a large extent, they are exogenously given.
The main result in the paper is that the structure of the controlling group
has a very significant impact on performance. Performance improves as the
control group’s ownership stake increases and, for a given ownership stake,
as the number of members increases. We find evidence of the existence of
both, bargaining among controlling shareholders to share private benefits,
and monitoring by non-controlling shareholders to reduce the private bene-
fits of the controlling group. The economic significance of the effects indicates
that minority expropriation is a much more important and widespread prob-
lem in closely-held firms than in listed firms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews
the theoretical literature about multiple large shareholders. The data and
variables are presented in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the determinants of
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the ownership structure. The results are presented in Section 5 and Section
6 deals with robustness checks. Section 7 concludes.
2 Overview of the theoretical literature on
multiple large shareholders.
While the presence of a majority shareholder is common in many firms, the
traditional literature on concentrated ownership can not explain satisfactorily
the cases where we observe the co-existence of multiple large shareholders in
a firm. Here we briefly review the predictions of the theoretical models that
have considered ownership structures with several large shareholders.
Pagano and Roël (1998) consider a setting in which the manager in con-
trol is a large shareholder who is monitored by other large shareholders. In
this case having two or more large shareholders monitoring the manager re-
sults in free-riding in monitoring but this free-riding enhances value because
it reduces excessive monitoring by a very large shareholder. Therefore, ac-
cording to Pagano and Roël (1998), an ownership structure with several large
shareholders is a commitment device that allows shareholders to commit to
an optimal monitoring intensity. The intuition behind this result is similar to
that in Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997), where the reduction in the size
of the ownership stake of the unique large shareholder reduces his incentives
to monitor, preserving managerial initiative. A trade-off between control and
initiative emerges contingent on the outside ownership concentration.
Gomes and Novaes (2001), Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) and Zwiebel
(1995) consider a setting in which the firm is controlled by a group of large
shareholders that together hold the majority of the voting rights.
In Gomes and Novaes (2001) the controlling group, which is formed by all
the large shareholders, will only approve a project if all the members of the
group benefit from the project. For a given ownership stake of the controlling
group, increasing the number of shareholders has two effects. The “bargaining
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effect”, which implies that private benefit taking and rent extraction will be
less likely, since all the members of the control group have to agree on the
preferred project. And the “disagreement effect”, which implies that the
approval of positive net present value projects also becomes more difficult
because of the necessary agreement of all the members of the controlling
group. Gomes and Novaes (2001) show the “bargaining effect” dominates
when there are few shareholders and the “disagreement effect” dominates
when the number of shareholders increases. Also, for a given number of
shareholders in the controlling group increasing the total ownership stake
makes both effects stronger.
In Bennedsen andWolfenzon (2000) the controlling group will not include
all the large shareholders but will be the result of a coalition formation game
where the different large shareholders form coalitions that compete to seize
the control of the firm. Many different coalitions can have sufficient voting
power to control the firm. Ex-ante the optimal coalition is the one with the
largest ownership stake because of an “alignment effect”. The greater the
ownership stake of the controlling coalition the more the coalition internalizes
the cost of dilution. However, ex-post, the preferred coalition will be the one
with the smallest ownership stake necessary to win control. This is the
“coalition formation effect”: given that private benefits come at the expense
of all the non-controlling shareholders, the coalition with the lowest possible
ownership stake will have the largest minority group whom to expropriate.
Zwiebel (1995) assumes that the control benefits will be divided among
the different blockholders depending on the relative size of their respective
blocks. Therefore, if one block is much larger than the rest the probability
that the small blockholders can share in the private benefits is reduced. In
equilibrium the investors allocate their money across firms trying to maxi-
mize their benefits of control. Zwiebel shows that there will exist a threshold
size beyond which the largest blockholder will not be challenged by other
investors. Therefore in equilibrium there are two types of firms: firms with
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only one large blockholder, where the size of the block is beyond the thresh-
old, and firms with several medium size blocks, where the size of the largest
block is below the threshold.
Finally, Bloch and Hege (2001) present a model that considers both the
monitoring and the private benefit sharing problems arising from ownership
structures with multiple large shareholders. In their model there are two
large shareholders that compete for control. The shareholders differ in their
capacity to define the company’s strategy and in their ability to monitor the
manager. Only the shareholder who wins the control contest defines the strat-
egy but both shareholders perform a monitoring role. In order to win control
the two large shareholders compete for the votes of the minority by commit-
ting to reduce their private benefits. The model is very rich and different
equilibria can be attained depending on the heterogeneity in the monitor-
ing costs and capacity to define strategy of the two competing shareholders.
The authors conclude that minority expropriation will be lower in companies
where control is more contestable, i.e. companies where the difference in the
stakes and the abilities of the large shareholders is smaller.
3 Data and methodology
3.1 Sample
To test the empirical predictions arising form the different theoretical models
we use the 1996 through 2000 SABE databases. These databases, available
from Bureau Van Dick, provide for each year the ownership structure, bal-
ance sheets and income statements for over 190000 Spanish firms that deposit
their financial statements in the Registro Mercantil (95% of all Spanish com-
panies). All Spanish firms are forced by law to deposit their annual financial
statements in this public register. However, the law does not establish a
penalty for not doing it unless the company goes bankrupt. This implies
that not all firms, especially the smaller ones, comply with this obligation,
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and that the quality of the information provided varies very much from firm
to firm. The initial sample has 553595 firm-year observations. We restrict
the sample using three criteria: we eliminate firms that do not report the
ownership structure, those that do not present detailed financial statements,
and those that are not corporations (cooperatives, partnerships, and propri-
etorship). Moreover, these three criteria have to be satisfied for at least three
of the four available years. We are left with an incomplete panel with a total
of 5288 different firms and 20313 firm-year observations.
This database has three main advantages. First, it contains a very com-
plete description of the ownership structure of the firms. We have the names
and ownership stakes of the shareholders that account for at least 50% of the
shares for 90% of the observations. This allows us to classify the sharehold-
ers into three main types, family, corporation, and other (including financial
institutions, state and cooperatives). Ownership by families is aggregated to
include family members with the same surname. Families are assumed to act
collectively. Second, the sample is representative of the total population of
firms in the economy: only 1% of the firms are listed in the Madrid Stock
Exchange, 13.5% are close corporations and the remaining 85.5% are open
non-listed firms. The presence of a sub-sample of listed firms allows us to
use market data alongside accounting profit measures of firm performance.
Third, we believe that Spain offers a very interesting case study, given the
dominance of concentrated ownership both in listed and non-listed firms and
the evidence of weak legal protection for minority shareholders (La Porta et
al. 1999).
3.2 Variables definition and descriptive statistics
Table 1 provides a description of the variables used in the study and their
summary statistics are shown in Table 2.
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here]
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3.2.1 Ownership structure variables
The first group of variables refers to the ownership structure. Following
Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) we assume that there will be a controlling
group that will effectively control firm decisions. Not all the large sharehold-
ers will be part of the controlling group. Among all the possible coalitions
that have a total stake large enough to control the firm, the one that will
prevail will have the minimum possible stake necessary to win control (here-
after the minimum stake group). For each firm-year observation we find the
minimum stake group and compute its total ownership stake and the number
of members of the group assuming that a stake in excess of 50% is necessary
to win control.
Most previous empirical studies of the impact of ownership concentration
on firm performance have used the total ownership stake of the 5 largest
shareholders as the relevant measure of ownership concentration, assuming
that control is shared equally among this group of shareholders4. To facilitate
the comparison of our results with the results of these previous studies and
to test whether the large shareholders do form control coalitions, we also
use a second definition of the controlling group as the group of the five
largest shareholders (hereafter five largest group). Again, for this alternative
definition of controlling group we compute the total ownership stake and the
number of members (which may be lower than five).
Although the ownership stake of the controlling group is a continuous
variable throughout the study we will use three dummy variables, 0-50%,
50-60% and 60-100%, that take the value of one if the ownership stake of
the control group is lower or equal to 50%, between 50 and 60% and higher
than 60% respectively. Controlling groups with a 50 to 60% ownership stake
are of particular interest because they have full control with relatively low
cash-flow rights and, thus, are the most likely to extract private benefits. Our
assumption that more than 50% is necessary to win control is not necessary
4Among them, Demsetz and Villalonga (2003) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985).
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valid for large firms, which could be controlled with a lower stake. Moreover,
the ultimate shareholders will be different and will have lower cash flow rights
if there are pyramidal ownership structures or dual-class shares. However,
this works in our favor, since it makes it less likely that we find evidence
of expropriation for the 50 to 60% group5. The interaction of the 50-60%
dummywith the dummies reflecting the number of members of the controlling
group will allow us to test the “bargaining” and “disagreement” effects of
Gomes and Novaes (2001).
We construct two more ownership variables. Second is a dummy variable
that takes the value one if the second shareholder has an ownership stake
larger than 10%. We will use this variable to test whether large shareholders
that are not in the controlling coalition do effectively monitor the controlling
group and reduce private benefit taking, as suggested by Pagano and Roël
(1998). Contestability measures the relative difference in the stakes of the
two largest owners. A high value of this variable indicates that the identity of
the largest owner can easily change and less private benefit extraction should
be expected.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Table 3 describes the ownership structure of our sample. The results for
the minimum stake group reflect that, as could be expected, ownership struc-
ture is very concentrated. In 88.8% the group of large shareholders has an
ownership stake greater than 50%. Interestingly multiple large shareholders
structures are common, 37.5% of the firms have multiple large shareholders
(firms with two or more members in the controlling group and firms with only
one controlling shareholder accompanied by a significant second shareholder).
5If there are pyramidal structures or dual-class shares (which is unlikely for closely-held
firms), expropriation will occur even for ownership stakes between 60 and 100%, because
ultimate cash flow rights would be lower than that. If the firm can be controlled with
a stake lower than 50% we would expect to find more expropriation for firms where the
controlling group has an ownership stake lower than 50%.
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We find two types of firms with multiple large shareholders. The first
type, with 19.9% of the firms, has a controlling group with two or more
members, none of whom by itself has a majority stake. The second type,
with 17.6% of the firms, has a first shareholder who controls the firm, owning
more than 50% of the shares, but is accompanied by (at least) a second large
non-controlling shareholder. Pagano and Roëll (1998) and Bloch and Hege
(2001) predict that the presence of these non-controlling shareholders adds
value because they have the role of monitoring the controlling one. Moreover,
this distribution of firms according to their ownership structure is inconsis-
tent with Zwiebel’s (1995) model. According to Zwiebel firms should fall into
one of two categories: firms with a single controlling shareholder possibly ac-
companied by small non-controlling shareholders (53.9% in our sample) and
firms with no single controlling shareholder and multiple large sharehold-
ers with similar stakes (19.9% in our sample). The existence of firms with
a single controlling shareholder accompanied by other large non-controlling
shareholders (17.6%) is not predicted by Zwiebel’s (1995) equilibrium model,
based solely on minority expropriation considerations.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
The ownership structure is very stable. Table 4 shows the percentage of
firms that change category within three years. Even after three years only
16.18% of the firms experiment an important change in ownership. It is also
worth noticing that firms where the controlling group has an ownership stake
in the 50-60% range are most likely to change towards a more concentrated
ownership structure. It is tempting to interpret this as evidence of the inef-
ficiency of this type of ownership structures, however the result may simply
be due to the small ownership range that we are considering.
3.2.2 Performance variables
We will use return on assets (ROA) as our measure of performance. Gilson
and Gordon (2003) argue that the main source of private benefit extraction
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are usually the direct dealings of the controlling shareholders with the con-
trolled firm, such as unfair transfer pricing, transfer of assets from the con-
trolled corporation to the controlling shareholder, the use of the controlled
firm’s assets as collateral for a controlling shareholder debt, etc. Thus minor-
ity expropriation problems are likely to be reflected either in lower revenues,
excessive production costs or in the inefficient employment of assets. These
things will result in a reduction in margins or asset rotation and, in turn,
lower margins and/or lower asset rotation will be reflected in a lower ROA.
To control for industry and year fixed effects we will use the difference with
respect to median ROA by 4-digit sector and year. For the sub-sample of
listed firms we will also use Tobin’s Q.
3.2.3 Control variables
In order to study the effects that ownership structure may have on perfor-
mance, we need to control for firm characteristics that may have a simulta-
neous effect on both ownership structure and performance, since, otherwise,
we may be identifying only a spurious correlation. The use of panel data
allows us to control for firm characteristics that are stable in time but we
still need to control for changing firm characteristics. In particular, we need
to control for changing firm characteristics that can affect the likelihood of
private benefit extraction, because the different theoretical models predict
that firms where private benefit extraction is likely to be important should
chose a differentiated ownership structure.
As the cost of monitoring increases, the non-controlling shareholders have
less incentives to monitor and the likelihood of expropriation increases. As
proxies for the cost of monitoring we use firm’s size, (measured as the log
of assets), age and assets’ intangibility (the ratio of intangible assets over
total assets). We expect larger firms and firms with more intangible assets
to be more difficult to monitor. The relationship between age and the cost of
monitoring is expected to be negative: younger firms should be more difficult
12
to monitor since there are no past records of performance.
If the rents available for distribution among shareholders are large, ex-
propriation is more tempting and less likely to be detected. Therefore, we
expect firms with large rents to be more likely to suffer minority expropria-
tion problems. Leverage, and product market competition (measured by the
Herfindhal index of sales) reduce the rents that can be expropriated, while
growth opportunities (measured by the 4-digit industry growth in sales) in-
crease them.
4 Determinants of the controlling group’s struc-
ture
We first investigate whether the structure of the controlling group is con-
sciously chosen by the initial owners. If this were the case we would expect
that firms whose characteristics make them more likely to suffer expropria-
tion problems to chose a larger controlling group with a larger joint stake
(Gomes and Novaes, 2001; Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000).
Notice that if the composition of the controlling group is chosen in aware-
ness of its consequences for performance, then performance and the struc-
ture of the controlling group should be unrelated. However, there are rea-
sons to think that the composition of the controlling group is (partially)
pre-determined by exogenous factors. Bebchuk and Roe (1999) argue that
potential changes in the ownership structure that could improve performance
are likely to be blocked by the parties that have the incentives and power to
impede them. In our case the incumbent controlling shareholders both have
the power and the incentives to prevent those changes. To the extent that
the ownership structure is given exogenously we would still expect it to have
significant effects on performance.
We examine the relationship between control group composition and firm
characteristics by estimating a multinomial logit model for the probability
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of choosing a particular controlling group’s structure. Our explanatory vari-
ables are the control variables, defined in the previous section, that make
private benefit extraction more or less likely: size, age, intangibility, lever-
age, Herfindhal and growth. This last variable also proxies for the importance
of disagreement costs, because deadlocks in decision making are more costly
for firms with growth opportunities.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
The results indicate that, as we expected, larger firms, younger firms, un-
listed firms whose shares are not liquid and firms operating in concentrated
industries are less likely to have controlling groups with, potentially danger-
ous, small ownership stakes. Assets intangibility and sector’s growth do not
seem to be important determinants of the ownership structure. Finally, we
find no significant differences between the probability of having a controlling
group with a stake lower than 50% and between 50 and 60%6.
Overall these results confirm our expectations. Firms with different char-
acteristics adjust, to a certain extent, the composition for their controlling
groups so as to prevent minority expropriation problems. However, the low
R2 indicates that we can explain only a very small fraction of the cross-section
variability in the composition of the controlling group. As we expected the
composition of the controlling group is, to a large extent, pre-determined
by the initial conditions and by exogenous factors such as the wealth, risk-
aversion and/or liquidity needs of the initial owners.
5 Performance effects of the controlling group’s
structure
We now examine the relation between the structure of the controlling group
and performance. The results from the previous section indicate that there
6Breaking up the 50 to 60% group into three groups depending on the number of
members (1, 2 and 3 or more) produces similar results for the three groups.
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are exogenous factors that largely determine the composition of the control-
ling group. This means that the effects of lower controlling stakes and smaller
controlling groups are not totally compensated by firm characteristics that
reduce the likelihood of expropriation. Therefore, we expect the composition
of the controlling group to have a significant effect on the degree of minority
expropriation that will be reflected in performance.
We estimate regressions of performance, measured by ROA on the own-
ership stake and number of members of the controlling group. We also in-
clude the variables that proxy for the likelihood of expropriation as control
variables. We use two different specifications for the controlling group: the
minimum stake group and the five largest shareholders group.
The panel structure of our data allows us to exploit the time variability of
the sample to control for potential unobservable heterogeneity and spurious
correlation problems that may be present in this regression model. We pro-
ceed in the following way. First we estimated a simple regression model with
the variables in levels and estimate heterocedasticity robust White standard
errors. If there are some unobservable firm characteristics that are correlated
both with the ownership structure and the performance of the firm (e.g. man-
agement quality), the coefficient estimates in this regression are biased. To
correct for this potential problem we reestimated our model with the vari-
ables in first differences, i.e. we estimated a fixed effects model. Hausman
tests indicate whether the coefficients in the simple regression model were in
fact biased. When this is the case we report fixed effects results, otherwise
we report the more efficient simple regression results.
The results for the minimum stake group and five largest shareholders
group are presented in Tables 6(a) and 6(b) respectively. They are quite
similar and our comments will refer to the minimum stake group specification.
[Insert Tables 6(a) and 6(b) about here]
There are 3 different specifications in each table. The dependent variable
is always the difference in ROA with respect to the 4-digit industry-year
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median. The ownership structure is captured by the dummies indicating the
ownership stake and number of members of the controlling group7.
The coefficient for the 0-50% dummy is always negative and significant
indicating that companies with low ownership concentration perform worst
than companies with ownership concentration in the 60-100% range. This
may be due either to agency problems or to minority expropriation problems,
since both result in private benefit extraction either by the manager or by
the large shareholders.
The coefficient on the 0-50% dummy is not significant in the first specifi-
cation. However it becomes negative and both, statistically and economically,
significant when we interact it with the 1M dummy in the second specifica-
tion.. If a firm in the 60-100% range has an adjusted ROA of 5%, a similar
firm with one controlling shareholder with an ownership stake in the 50 to
60% range will have an adjusted ROA of only 3,8% (5%-1.2%). The co-
efficient on the 0-50%*1M dummy being larger in absolute value than the
coefficient on the 0-50% dummy clearly indicates that controlling sharehold-
ers use their power to expropriate minority shareholders. Interestingly, firms
with a controlling group with an ownership stake in the 50 to 60% range
but more than one member do not perform worst that the control group of
firms in the 60 to 100% range. Therefore, the presence of multiple controlling
shareholders reduces expropriation. This provides support for the existence
of the “bargaining” effect predicted by Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) and
Gomes and Novaes (2001). We do not find evidence of the existence of the
“disagreement” effects predicted by Gomes and Novaes (2001), since perfor-
mance does not deteriorate for firms with 3 or more controlling shareholders.
This may be due to the fact that there are very few firms with more than
four controlling shareholders, and disagreement problems may appear only
for larger groups.
7An alternative specification with countinuous variables within each range produces
similar results but the coefficients for the dummy variables are easier to interpret.
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In the third specification we find that minority expropriation is especially
severe when there are no significant shareholders other than the single con-
trolling shareholder, i.e. when 0-50%*1M*(1-second) takes the value one.
This indicates that non-controlling shareholders play a monitoring role that
can make private benefit extraction more costly for the controlling share-
holder, as hypothesized by Pagano and Röel (1998). In this specification
we also introduce the contestability variable suggested by Block and Hedge
(2001), which has a positive and significant effect on performance. The sim-
ilarity in the stakes of the first and second shareholders is likely to enhance
both the bargaining power (if the second shareholder is in the controlling
group) and the monitoring incentives (if he is not) of the second shareholder.
This results in a reduction of private benefit extraction.
Finally, most of the control variables are significant indicating that, ce-
teris paribus, larger, younger and less indebted firms perform better than
other firms in their industry. A high value of intangibility has a negative
effect on performance, which may reflect a low collateral value of assets and
difficulties for accessing the credit market. It is difficult to interpret the posi-
tive coefficient on the Herfindahl value, which may be due to large differences
in ROA among firms in concentrated industries.
The extend of the minority expropriation problem that we have identified
may depend on firm characteristics that can make private benefit extraction
more likely such as the size of the firm, the difficulties for trading shares, the
ownership status of the CEO and the identity of the largest shareholder. In
order to capture the potential differences we break our sample according to
the proposed characteristics and reestimate our model for each sub-sample.
The results are reported in Tables 7(a), 7(b), 7(c) and 7(d).8
[Insert Table 7(a) about here]
Table 7(a) shows the results depending on the size of the firm. Both small
8We only report the results for the controlling group defined as the minimum stake
group. Results for the 5 largest shareholders group are very similar.
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and medium size firms seem to have important minority expropriation prob-
lems, with a negative and significant coefficient on the 50-60%*1M dummy.
For medium firms the coefficient on the 0-50% dummy is also negative, in-
dicating that these firms may be controlled with a stake lower than 50%
or that medium firms without controlling groups may suffer agency costs.
However, we find no effects for the size of the controlling stake in the largest
firms. This is surprising, since one would expect large firms, which are more
difficult to monitor, to be more likely to suffer agency and minority expropri-
ation problems. The reason for this may be that there are very few firms in
the reference range (firms with a controlling group with a 60 to 100% stake).
Nevertheless we still find the positive effects of having multiple controlling
shareholders.
[Insert Table 7(b) about here]
In Table 7(b) we report the results depending on the trading restrictions
that the shareholders face. In close corporations trading is restricted to in-
cumbent shareholders and a shareholder can only sell his stake to an outsider
with the agreement of the other shareholders. The reduced liquidity of the
shares makes minority shareholders more vulnerable to expropriation. Open
firms are an intermediate case where the shares can be freely traded, but
since they are not listed in the stock exchange, transaction costs are likely to
be large. For listed firms shares can be freely traded on the stock exchange.
Moreover, the strict information requirements that listed firms have to com-
ply with and the public scrutiny to which they are subject, make them less
likely to suffer from minority expropriation problems. This is reflected in the
estimation results. Minority expropriation is much more severe in close firms
than in open firms, and we find no evidence of minority expropriation for
listed firms.
[Insert Table 7(c) about here]
Table 7(c) reports the results depending on the CEO’s ownership status.
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We would expect that, when there is one controlling shareholder with an
intermediate ownership stake who is also the CEO, expropriation should be
more severe, since he can effectively control the day-to-day decisions of the
firm. We would also expect that if the CEO is not the largest shareholder, but
has an ownership stake in the company, his bargaining power vis-a-vis other
large shareholders may reduce minority expropriation. This is consistent
with the results that indicate important minority expropriation problems for
both, firms where the CEO owns no shares and for firms where the CEO is
the largest owner, but not for firms where the CEO has a non-controlling
ownership stake. It is also worth noticing that firms where the CEO owns
no shares perform significantly worst than other firms (with a large, negative
and significant intercept), which could indicate the lack of incentives that
the CEO has to improve performance.
[Insert Table 7(d) about here]
The results for the identity of the largest shareholder appear in Table
7(d). Gilson and Gordon (2003) suggest that controlling shareholders can be
classified in two groups: those whose only connection to the firm is through
its shareholdings and those who also have operational ties to the firm, say as
a customer or supplier. The former have fewer direct means to extract private
benefits than the later. Taking into account this distinction one would expect
that firms controlled by other firms, who are likely to have commercial ties
with it, are more likely to suffer minority expropriation than firms controlled
by families. This is confirmed by the results in Table 7(d), where the coef-
ficient on the 0-50%*1M*(1-second) dummy is negative but not significant
for families but is very large and significant for firms. The results for other
types of shareholders are difficult to interpret. This is a diverse group with
the state as the most frequent owner, followed by financial institutions. The
large and negative intercept indicates that these firms perform much worst
than other firms, which may be the reason why the state or the financial
institution became or remain as large shareholders.
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6 Robustness checks
6.1 Results for listed firms
The main focus of this paper is to investigate how multiple large shareholders
share control and extract private benefits in closely-held corporations, where
minority expropriation problems are most likely to be severe. ROA is the
obvious measure of performance for these firms. However our sample con-
tains a small sub-sample of listed firms. For these firms we have market data
and we can use Tobin’s Q as the measure of performance. As Demsetz and
Villalonga (2003) point out there are no clear a priori reasons why we should
prefer one measure of performance over the other. ROA is affected by ac-
counting practices which may hide expropriation, but Tobin’s Q will also be
subject to accounting problems if investors use past performance information
to infer the future. Moreover, Tobins’ Q is forward-looking, reflecting expec-
tations of private benefit extraction, while ROA, being backward-looking,
should reflect effective minority expropriation. Nevertheless it is interesting
to test the robustness of our results using both measures.
[Insert Table 8 about here]
Table 8 reports the estimation results for the sample of listed firms using
Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable. These results can be compared to the
results reported in Table 7(b) where, using ROA as the dependent variable,
we found no evidence of expropriation for listed firms. The results for the
minimum stake group in Table 8 indicate that companies where the large
shareholders own less than 50% perform better than other firms. This is
probably due to the fact that firms with a diluted ownership structure, where
expropriation is most unlikely to occur, are included in the 0 to 50% range.
The second interesting result is that for a controlling stake between 50 and
60%, firms with three of more shareholders in the controlling group perform
better, which confirms that multiple large shareholders may prevent minority
expropriation.
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We do not find any results when we define the controlling group as the
group of the five largest shareholders, which could indicate that, as predicted
by Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000), large shareholders do in fact form coali-
tions in order to control the firm, and that this has to be taken into account
when studying the effects of the ownership structure on firm performance.
6.2 Reverse causality
When we defined our control variables we explained that the use of panel
data allows us to control for spurious correlation. A second potential econo-
metric problem that may arise in the estimation of the relationship between
ownership structure and performance is the reverse causality problem, i.e.
rather than identifying the effect of ownership on performance we may be
identifying the effect of performance on the ownership structure. Himmelberg
et al. (1999) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2003) claim that insiders superior
information about future performance creates an incentive for varying their
stakes.
This problem could be solved by introducing instruments in our estima-
tions, i.e. variables correlated with the current ownership structure but not
with current performance. The obvious candidates are lagged values of the
ownership variables, but they are not good instruments for our sample be-
cause ownership structures are very stable. However, it is very unlikely that
reverse causality may be a mayor problem for our sample of closely-held firms.
First, ownership structures are very stable, while the within firm variability
of ROA is large. Second, the results in Section 3 indicate that ownership
structures are, to a large extent, pre-determined by the initial conditions
and by exogenous factors. Finally, the absence of a liquid market in which
shares may be traded makes it very unlikely that large shareholders can trade
on the basis of short or medium term expectations about earnings.
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7 Conclusions
In this paper we evaluate empirically the role of concentrated ownership
structures with multiple large shareholders for a sample of closely-held Span-
ish firms for the years 1996 through 2000. We test the empirical predictions
of the different theoretical models that try to explain the existence, the func-
tioning and the consequences of this type of ownership structures.
We capture the complexity of the ownership structure using two vari-
ables: the ownership stake and the number of members of the controlling
group. The controlling group is defined alternatively as the minimum stake
coalition of large shareholders that can effectively control the firm and as
the group of the five largest shareholders. We find that ownership structures
with multiple large shareholders are common (37.5% of the sample) and that
ownership structures are very stable (with only 16.18% of the firms experi-
encing important changes in ownership over a three year period). We inves-
tigate whether firms whose characteristics make them more likely to suffer
minority expropriation problems choose different ownership structures. Our
results indicate that firms with higher monitoring costs and / or larger rents,
as measured by firm size, age, listing status and by the industry’s Herfindhal
index of sales concentration are more likely to have a controlling group with
a larger stake. However, these variables can only explain a small part of the
cross sectional variability in ownership structures.
When we study the effects of ownership structure on performance we find
evidence of private benefits extraction by controlling groups with intermedi-
ate ownership stakes, i.e. ownership stakes large enough to confer control of
the decisions of the firm but too small to force the controlling shareholders
to internalize the costs of expropriation. The presence of more than one con-
trolling shareholder substantially decreases private benefit extraction. We
interpret this as evidence of the bargaining for private benefits that occurs
among the large shareholders that are forced to share control. The pres-
ence of large shareholders outside the controlling group also has a positive
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effect on performance, which we attribute to the monitoring role that they
can perform. These bargaining and monitoring effects are stronger when the
stakes of the first and second shareholders are of similar size, i.e. when the
ownership structure is more contestable.
Moreover, minority expropriation is more pronounced when (i) the liq-
uidity of the shares is restricted, (ii) the CEO does not own shares or the
CEO is the controlling shareholder and (iii) the largest shareholder is a firm
that may have commercial ties with the controlled firm.
Overall our results indicate that, when studying the impact of owner-
ship on performance, it is important to take into account the structure of
the controlling coalitions that large shareholders will form, in terms of their
ownership stake and number of members. Finally, the economic significance
of the results indicates that minority expropriation in closely-held firms is
an important and widespread problem that has not yet received enough at-
tention from empirical researchers, who have mainly focused on studying the
problems of listed firms.
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Table 1
Variables’ definitions
Controlling group:
Minimum stake group Coalition formed by the shareholders whose joint ownership
stake is the minimum stake larger than 50%.
5 Largest group Group formed by the 5 largest shareholders.
Ownership stake of controlling group:
0-50% Dummy variable that is 1 if the ownership stake of the
controlling group is lower or equal to 50%, 0 otherwise.
50-60% Dummy variable that is 1 if the ownership stake of the
controlling group is in the 50-60% range, 0 otherwise.
60-100% Dummy variable that is 1 if the ownership stake of the
controlling group is larger or equal to 60%, 0 otherwise.
Number of members of the controlling group:
1M Dummy variable that is 1 if the number of members of the
controlling group is 1, 0 otherwise.
2M Dummy variable that is 1 if the number of members of the
controlling group is 2, 0 otherwise.
3M Dummy variable that is 1 if the number of members of the
controlling group is 3 or more, 0 otherwise.
Additional ownership variables:
Second Dummy variable that is 1 if the second largest shareholder
has an ownership stake larger than 10%.
Contestability Ratio of 1 minus the % joint ownership stake of the two largest
shareholders divided by 100 times the difference in their stakes.
Performance variables:
ROA 4 digit industry and year adjusted return on assets computed
as the ratio of EBITDA over book value of assets.
Tobin’s Q Year-end market value of equity plus book value of debt over
book value of total assets.
Control variables:
Size Logarithm of total assets.
Age Years since foundation.
Intangibility Intangible assets over total assets.
Listed Dummy variable that is 1 if the firm is listed in the Madrid
Stock Exchange, 0 otherwise.
Leverage Total book value of liabilities over total assets.
Herfindahl 4 digit industry Herfindahl index of sales concetration.
Growth 4 digit industry % chage in sales year-on-year.
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Table 2
Summary statistics
Variable Observations Mean St.dev. Min Median Max
Ownership stake:
Minimum stake group% 20313 79.00 26.59 0.01 94 100
5 largest group 20313 86.86 25.98 0.01 100 100
Number of members:
Minimum stake group% 18041 1.36 1.22 1 1 10
5 largest group 20313 1.83 1.17 1 1 5
Contestability 20313 0.05 0.14 0 0 0.99
ROA% 20313 9.50 13.25 -365.20 8.23 170.55
ROA% (adjusted) 20313 0.37 12.69 -372.65 -0.44 158.07
Tobin’s Q 211 2.03 3.08 0.18 1.21 25.08
Assets (thousands of euros) 20313 23100 13700 1.77 7853 7830000
Size (log of assets) 20313 15.98 1.16 7.47 15.87 22.78
Age 20313 19.27 13.80 0 16 112
Intangibility% 20313 11.19 18.62 0 2.19 100
Listed 20313 0.003 0.05 0 0 1
Leverage% 20313 53.62 75.06 0 56.82 9791.475
Herfindahl 20313 0.17 0.25 0.001 0.06 1
Growth% 20313 12.38 80.68 -27.06 10.62 6629.82
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Table 3
Prevalence of multiple large shareholders
Control group defined as minimum stake group
Ownership stake
0-50% 50-60% 60-100%
11.2% 17.8% 71%
Number of members
1 (no significant second) 8.6% 2.6% 51.3%
1 (significant second) 6.2% 11.2%
2 1.9% 5.5% 7.7%
3 or more 0.7% 3.5% 0.6%
Control group defined as 5 largest shareholders group
Ownership stake
0-50% 50-60% 60-100%
11.2% 3.4% 85.4%
Number of members
1 8.6% 2.3% 43.7%
2 1.9% 0.54% 22.4%
3 or more 0.7% 0.56% 19.3%
% of firms in each cathegory. We consider the second shareholder
as significant if his ownership stake is equal or larger than 10%.
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Table 4
Stability of ownership structure
Control group defined as minimum stake group
Ownership stake year t
0-50% 50-60% 60-100%
9% 24% 67%
Ownership stake year t+3
0-50% 70% 5% 2%
50-60% 10% 55% 2%
60-100% 20% 40% 96%
Control group defined as 5 largest shareholders group
Ownership stake year t
0-50% 50-60% 60-100%
9% 3% 88%
Ownership stake year t+3
0-50% 69% 3% 3%
50-60% 3% 40% 1%
60-100% 28% 57% 96%
% of firms moving from one cathegory to the other.
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Table 5
Determinants of ownership structure
Model 1 Model 2
Controlling group: Minimum stake 5 Largest
Regression type: Multinomial Logit Multinomial Logit
State: 0-50% 50-60% 60-100% 0-50% 50-60% 60-100%
Size -0.008 (0.003)∗∗∗ -0.025 (0.004)∗∗∗ 0.034 (0.004)∗∗∗ -0.008 (0.003)∗∗∗ -0.009 (0.002)∗∗∗ 0.0178 (0.003)∗∗∗
Age 0.023 (0.003)∗∗∗ 0.010 (0.005)∗ -0.033 (0.006)∗∗∗ 0.022 (0.003)∗∗∗ 0.001 (0.002) -0.024 (0.004)∗∗∗
Intangibility -0.0002 (0.0004) 0.0006 (0.0005) -0.0004 (0.0006) -0.0002 (0.0004) 0.0002 (0.0002) 0.0002 (0.0005)
Listed -0.001 (0.049) 0.427 (0.103)∗∗∗ -0.426 (0.091)∗∗∗ 0.042 (0.058) 0.151 (0.100) -0.194 (0.112)∗
Leverage -0.002 (0.004) -0.002 (0.004) 0.004 (0.006) -0.003 (0.005) -0.004 (0.003) 0.007 (0.006)
Herfindahl -0.003 (0.0007)∗∗∗ -0.003 (0.0008)∗∗∗ 0.006 (0.0009)∗∗∗ -0.003 (0.0007)∗∗∗ -0.001 (0.0004)∗∗∗ 0.004 (0.0008)∗∗∗
Growth 0.0004 (0.001) -0.004 (0.007) 0.004 (0.006) -0.0001 (0.0004) -0.001 (0.003) 0.001 (0.002)
Frequency 0.11 0.18 0.71 0.11 0.04 0.85
Log-likelihood -15991.2 -9955.4
Pseudo-R2 0.013 0.012
χ2 160.38∗∗∗ 134.33∗∗∗
Number of obs. 20313 20313
Quasi-elasticities at the sample median, indicating the percentage point change in the probability of the state upon a 1% increase in the
explanatory variable. Model 1 defines controlling group as the minimum stake group, while Model 2 defines the controlling group as the
5 largest shareholdersgroup. *,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 6 (a)
Minimum stake controlling group and ROA
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Controlling group: Minimum stake Minimum stake Minimum stake
Regression type: Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects
Dependent variable: ROA ROA ROA
0-50% -0.94 (0.39)∗∗ -0.82 (0.39)∗∗ -1.08 (0.41)∗∗∗
50-60% -0.52 (0.32)
50-60%*1M -1.20 (0.42)∗∗∗
50-60%*1M*(1-Second) -2.31 (0.66)∗∗∗
50-60%*1M*Second -0.85 (0.46)∗
50-60%*2M -0.28 (0.46) -0.52 (0.48)
50-60%*3M 0.40 (0.52) 0.06 (0.55)
Contestability 1.80 (0.77)∗∗
Size 0.91 (0.21)∗∗∗ 0.91 (0.21)∗∗∗ 0.92 (0.21)∗∗∗
Age -0.24 (0.04)∗∗∗ -0.24 (0.04)∗∗∗ -0.23 (0.04)∗∗∗
Intangibility -0.02 (0.008)∗∗∗ -0.02 (0.008)∗∗∗ -0.02 (0.008)∗∗∗
Listed -7.53 (5.14) -7.82 (5.14) -8.00 (5.14)
Leverage -0.036 (0.001)∗∗∗ -0.03 (0.001)∗∗∗ -0.03 (0.001)∗∗∗
Herfindahl 1.68 (0.29)∗∗∗ 1.68 (0.29)∗∗∗ 1.65 (0.29)∗∗∗
Growth 0.007 (0.014) 0.007 (0.01) 0.008 (0.01)
Intercept -7.53 (3.21)∗∗ -7.63 (3.21)∗∗ -7.87 (3.22)∗∗
R2 0.114 0.114 0.115
F-value 215.18∗∗∗ 176.74∗∗∗ 150.40∗∗∗
Hausman 176.63∗∗∗ 186.02∗∗∗ 199.76∗∗∗
Number of obs. 20313 20313 20313
Controlling group defined as the minimum stake group.*,**,*** denote significance at the
10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 6 (b)
5 largest shareholders controlling group and ROA
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Controlling group: 5 Largest 5 Largest 5 Largest
Regression type: Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects
Dependent variable: ROA ROA ROA
0-50% -0.78 (0.36)∗∗ -0.71 (0.36)∗ -0.90 (0.37)∗
50-60% -1.34 (0.51)∗∗
50-60%*1M -2.16 (0.66)∗∗∗ -2.15 (0.66)∗∗∗
50-60%*1M*(1-Second)
50-60%*1M*Second
50-60%*2M -0.43 (1.12) -0.54 (1.12)
50-60%*3M 1.17 (1.11) -0.06 (1.12)
Contestability 1.79 (0.73)∗∗∗
Size 0.91 (0.21)∗∗∗ 0.91 (0.21)∗∗∗ 0.92 (0.21)∗∗∗
Age -0.23 (0.04)∗∗∗ -0.23 (0.04)∗∗∗ -0.22 (0.04)∗∗∗
Intangibility -0.02 (0.008)∗∗∗ -0.02 (0.008)∗∗∗ -0.02 (0.008)∗∗∗
Listed -7.66 (5.14) -7.63 (5.14) -7.92 (0.14)
Leverage -0.03 (0.001)∗∗∗ -0.03 (0.001)∗∗∗ -0.03 (0.001)∗∗∗
Herfindahl 1.66 (0.29)∗∗∗ 1.65 (0.29)∗∗∗ 1.65 (0.29)∗∗∗
Growth 0.008 (0.014) 0.008 (0.01) 0.009 (0.01)
Intercept -7.72 (3.21)∗∗ -7.74 (3.21)∗∗ -8.14 (3.21)∗∗
R2 0.114 0.114 0.115
F-value 215.66∗∗∗ 176.84∗∗∗ 162.66∗∗∗
Hausman 186.91∗∗∗ 196.27∗∗∗ 196.92∗∗∗
Number of obs. 20313 20313 20313
Controlling group defined as the 5 largest shareholders group.*,**,*** denote significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 7 (a)
Minimum stake controlling group and ROA by firm’s size
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Sub-sample: Small firms Medium firms Large firms
Controlling group: Minimum stake Minimum stake Minimum stake
Regression type: Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects
Dependent variable: ROA ROA ROA
0-50% -1.11 (0.84) -1.28 (0.57)∗∗ -0.93 (1.17)
50-60%*1M*(1-Second) -2.38 (1.21)∗∗ -1.92 (0.95)∗∗ -0.92 (2.42)
50-60%*1M*Second -1.17 (0.84) -0.89 (0.67) 1.65 (1.66)
50-60%*2M -1.35 (0.94) -0.62 (0.68) 3.53 (1.75)∗∗
50-60%*3M -0.91 (1.10) -0.64 (0.75) 3.32 (1.97)∗
Contestability 1.92 (1.60) 2.21 (1.02)∗∗ 0.45 (2.51)
Size 2.49 (0.51)∗∗∗ 0.14 (0.35) -0.78 (0.61)
Age -0.38 (0.11)∗∗∗ -0.15 (0.07)∗∗ -0.03 (0.08)
Intangibility -0.03 (0.01)∗∗ -0.02 (0.01)∗ 0.05 (0.03)∗
Listed -9.49 (6.73) -5.05 (6.56)
Leverage -0.03 (0.01)∗∗∗ -0.05 (0.01)∗∗∗ -0.11 (0.01)∗∗∗
Herfindahl 1.84 (0.65)∗∗∗ 1.42 (0.40)∗∗∗ 2.83 (0.74)∗∗∗
Growth 0.02 (0.03) 0.01 (0.02) 0.09 (0.04)∗∗
Intercept -28.55 (7.27)∗∗∗ 3.76 (5.30) 17.90 (10.36)∗
R2 0.015 0.017 0.097
F-value 5.47∗∗∗ 9.44∗∗∗ 12.21∗∗∗
Hausman 79.56∗∗∗ 17.63∗∗∗ 27.83∗∗∗
Number of obs. 6448 10176 2204
Small firms have less than 50 workers and total assets bellow 10 million euros. Large firms
have more than 250 workers or assets above 100 million euros. Controlling group defined
as the minimum stake group.*,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels
respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 7 (b)
Minimum stake controlling group and ROA by firm’s type
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Sub-sample: Closed firms Open firms Listed firms
Controlling group: Minimum stake Minimum stake Minimum stake
Regression type: Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects
Dependent variable: ROA ROA ROA
0-50% -2.13 (1.72) -1.03 (0.42)∗∗ -1.03 (2.71)
50-60%*1M*(1-Second) -8.83 (2.36)∗∗∗ -1.49 (0.69)∗∗ -1.13 (3.18)
50-60%*1M*Second 0.62 (1.66) -1.03 (0.48)∗∗ -2.11 (6.18)
50-60%*2M -0.85 (1.74) -0.54 (0.50) 1.70 (2.90)
50-60%*3M 0.02 (2.55) 0.10 (0.56) -2.40 (2.56)
Contestability 0.27 (2.88) 1.96 (0.80)∗∗ -2.20 (2.41)
Size 2.15 (0.64)∗∗∗ 0.73 (0.23)∗∗∗ 0.16 (1.26)
Age -0.69 (0.21)∗∗∗ -0.20 (0.05)∗∗∗ 0.07 (0.36)
Intangibility -0.08 (0.02)∗∗∗ -0.01 (0.01) -0.07 (0.09)
Leverage -0.04 (0.01)∗∗∗ -0.04 (0.00)∗∗∗ -0.07 (0.05)
Herfindahl 2.52 (0.91)∗∗ 1.61 (0.31)∗∗∗ 1.74 (2.28)
Growth 0.03 (0.06) 0.01 (0.02) -0.04 (0.06)
Intercept -20.38 (8.89)∗∗ -5.60 (3.47) 1.45 (22.34)
R2 0.03 0.13 0.10
F-value 5.08∗∗∗ 168.12∗∗∗ 0.99
Hausman 48.54∗∗∗ 177.73∗∗∗ 22.79∗∗
Number of obs. 2754 17338 211
Controlling group defined as the minimum stake group.*,**,*** denote significance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 7 (c)
Minimum stake controlling group and ROA by CEO’s ownership status
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Sub-sample:
CEO is largest
shareholder
CEO owns
some shares
CEO owns
no shares
Controlling group: Minimum stake Minimum stake Minimum stake
Regression type: Fixed effects OLS Fixed effects
Dependent variable: ROA ROA ROA
0-50% -1.58 (1.24) -1.70 (2.16) -1.30 (0.57)∗∗
50-60%*1M*(1-Second) -2.34 (1.20)∗ -0.77 (3.97) -2.24 (0.91)∗∗
50-60%*1M*Second 0.19 (1.29) 0.01 (1.16) -1.62 (0.74)∗∗
50-60%*2M 0.61 (1.74) —2.34 (1.24)∗ -0.60 (0.80)
50-60%*3M 3.34 (3.22) —1.51 (1.30) 0.22 (0.87)
Contestability 2.72 (4.42) -1.70 (3.11) 1.27 (1.18)
Size 0.33 (0.52) 1.03 (0.42)∗∗ 1.61 (0.28)∗∗∗
Age 0.40 (0.17)∗∗∗ 0.002 (0.03)∗∗∗ -0.21 (0.06)∗∗∗
Intangibility -0.02 (0.02) 0.003 (0.02) -0.02 (0.01)
Listed -12.97 (10.22) -7.18 (6.24)
Leverage -0.05 (0.01)∗∗∗ -0.15 (0.01)∗∗∗ -0.04 (0.00)∗∗∗
Herfindahl 1.43 (0.54)∗∗ 2.69 (0.94)∗∗∗ 1.75 (0.40)∗∗∗
Growth 0.10 (0.05)∗ 0.03 (0.05) 0.00 (0.02)
Intercept -10.75 (8.37) -7.05 (6.58) -19.44 (4.35)∗∗∗
R2 0.02 0.17 0.15
F-value / χ2 5.02∗∗∗ 186.49 128.75∗∗∗
Hausman 30.12∗∗∗ 17.47 192.87∗∗∗
Number of obs. 4065 848 14027
Controlling group defined as the minimum stake group.*,**,*** denote significance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 7 (d)
Minimum stake controlling group and ROA by largest shareholder’s type
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Sub-sample: Family Firm Other
Controlling group: Minimum stake Minimum stake Minimum stake
Regression type: Fixed effects Fixed effects OLS
Dependent variable: ROA ROA ROA
0-50% -1.78 (0.01)∗∗ -0.86 (0.21) 9.86 (4.73)∗
50-60%*1M*(1-Second) -1.00 (0.30) -3.65 (0.00)∗∗∗ 1.03 (5.49)
50-60%*1M*Second -0.37 (0.49) -2.81 (0.00)∗∗∗ 4.07 (3.90)
50-60%*2M -0.69 (0.22) -0.64 (0.51) 2.27 (5.59)
50-60%*3M -0.11 (0.87) 0.72 (0.51) 2.63 (6.47)
Contestability 2.41 (0.02)∗∗ 0.98 (0.49) 4.37 (10.50)
Size 0.99 (0.00)∗∗∗ 1.17 (0.00)∗∗∗ 2.01 (1.06)∗
Age -0.32 (0.00)∗∗∗ -0.11 (0.13) -0.15 (0.10)
Intangibility 0.00 (0.88) -0.04 (0.00)∗∗∗ -0.07 (0.06)
Listed -5.44 (0.40) -9.09 (0.33) 0.50 (12.94)
Leverage -0.06 (0.00)∗∗∗ -0.04 (0.00)∗∗∗ -0.05 (0.03)∗
Herfindahl 1.93 (0.00)∗∗∗ 1.58 (0.00)∗∗∗ 0.39 (3.03)
Growth 0.04 (0.03)∗∗ 0.00 (0.90) -0.001 (0.003)
Intercept -6.42 (0.14) -13.73 (0.00)∗∗∗ -36.12 (16.91)∗∗
R2 0.04 0.17 0.01
F-value /χ2 17.78∗∗∗ 115.97∗∗∗ 14.08
Hausman 164.63∗∗∗ 104.96∗∗∗ 11.80
Number of obs. 8584 10718 639
Controlling group defined as the minimum stake group.*,**,*** denote significance at the
10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.
37
Table 8
Multiple controlling shareholders and market values
Model 1 Model 2
Controlling group: Minimum stake 5 Largest
Regression type: Fixed effects Fixed effects
Dependent variable: Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q
0-50% 0.85 (0.39)∗∗ 0.08 (0.26)
50-60%*1M -0.47 (0.62)
50-60%*1M*(1-Second) 0.04 (0.46)
50-60%*1M*Second 0.58 (0.91)
50-60%*2M 0.22 (0.42) 0.09 (0.81)
50-60%*3M 0.83 (0.37)∗∗ -0.16 (0.30)
Contestability 0.05 (0.35) 0.08 (0.37)
Size -2.02 (0.18)∗∗∗ -2.05 (0.19)∗∗∗
Age 0.10 (0.05)∗ 0.08 (0.05)
Intangibility -0.03 (0.01)∗∗∗ -0.03 (0.01)∗∗
Leverage 0.04 (0.006)∗∗∗ 0.04 (0.007)∗∗∗
Herfindahl -0.48 (0.33) -0.49 (0.35)
Growth 0.01 (0.008) 0.01 (0.008)
Intercept 36.15 (3.29)∗∗∗ 38.10 (3.25)∗∗∗
R2 0.61 0.58
F-value 14.24∗∗∗ 13.78∗∗∗
Hausman 136.37∗∗∗ 146.80∗∗∗
Number of obs. 211 211
Model 1 defines controlling group as the minimum stake group, while
Model 2 defines the controlling group asthe 5 largest shareholders
group.*,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels
respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.
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